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ABSTRACT
We studied the web permission API dialog box in popular mobile
and desktop browsers, and found that it typically lacks measures
to protect users from unwittingly granting web permission when
clicking too fast.
We developed a game that exploits this issue, and tricks users
into granting webcam permission.We conducted three experiments,
each with 40 different participants, on both desktop and mobile
browsers. The results indicate that in the absence of a prevention
mechanism, we achieve a considerably high success rate in trick-
ing 95% and 72% of participants on mobile and desktop browsers,
respectively. Interestingly, we also tricked 47% of participants on a
desktop browser where a prevention mechanism exists.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a clickjacking attack, an attacker tricks a user into clicking on
webpage element that is hidden or disguised as another element.
This can result in a situation in which the user takes an action un-
wittingly. For instance, attackers have used clickjacking attacks to
trick users into liking a fan page on Facebook or re-tweeting a mes-
sage on Twitter [2]. Several clickjacking attacks targeted the Adobe
Flash Player’s webcam access dialog to enable the victims’ webcam
and microphone [5]. Adobe finally fixed the issue by ensuring that
the webcam access dialog is fully visible to users.
There are a number of ways in which clickjacking attacks can be
prevented. The widely accepted approach is to use frame busting
techniques. Frame busting refers to client-side code that is designed
to prevent a given web page from being loaded in a sub-frame. Many
JavaScript code snippets have been proposed to perform frame
busting, though many of these have been found to be vulnerable
later [8]. A more robust solution is to send a special HTTP header,
e.g., X-Frame-Options, which is supported by some browsers such
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as Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome [7]. The X-Frame-Options
header prohibits a website from being rendered within an iframe.
However, some older versions of browsers do not support the special
header that prevents Clickjacking attacks. Buchanan et al. analyzed
Alexa’s top one million sites and their results show that X-Frame-
Options is implemented in only a small fraction (i.e., 11.11%) of the
websites [4].
In this paper, we discuss the lack of a preventive measure, e.g., a
delay period, in many browsers when the web permission dialog
box pops up. This is a browser-dependent feature, and none of the
aforementioned countermeasures could guarantee user safety. In
order to highlight the importance of this issue, we investigate the
following research question: “How can the web permission dialog
box be abused, and how effective are the existing preventive measures
in browsers?” To this end, we designed an experimental game, called
“Furious Clicker,” to evaluate whether or not users can be tricked
into granting webcam permission by clicking on the allow button of
the web permission API’s dialog box. We asked 120 participants to
take part in our web-based game experiment. We conducted three
experiments, each with 40 different participants, on both desktop
andmobile browsers.We used themobile version of Google Chrome
on Android, and the desktop version of Mozilla Firefox and Google
Chrome on Mac OS. The results indicate that, in the absence of a
prevention mechanism, we achieve a considerably high success rate
in tricking 95% of participants on a mobile browser, and 72% on a
desktop browser. We also tricked 47% of participants on a desktop
browser where a prevention mechanism exists.
We conclude that without a preventive measure end users suffer
from severe security implications. For instance, the Android ver-
sion of the Google Chrome browser, with more than five billion
downloads on Google Play, has no prevention mechanism. Never-
theless, the impact of any countermeasure, such as a delay when
the permission dialog box appears, on the user experience needs to
be taken into account.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2,
we explain our motivation and various types of clickjacking attacks.
In section 3 we introduce the Furious Clicker game. In section 4
we present a user experiment study, and discuss related work in
section 5. We conclude this paper in section 6.
2 MOTIVATION
We present the web permission API, how it can be abused, and what
factors are essential to consider in abusing the web permission API.
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Table 1: Tested browsers and position of permission dialog box
Browser Version Platform Position Alert Behavior Prevention
Firefox 68 macOS - desktop Top Left Icon Ask again Yes
Chrome 77 macOS - desktop Top Left Icon Never ask Yes
Safari 13 macOS - desktop Top Center Icon Ask again No
Chrome 78 Android - mobile Center Notification Never ask No
Firefox 68 Android - mobile Top Notification Ask again No
Edge 42 Android - mobile Center Notification Never ask No
Dolphin 8 Android - mobile Center - Never ask No
Mint 61 Android - mobile Bottom - Never ask No
Samsung 10 Android - mobile Bottom - Never ask No
Mi Browser 11 Android - mobile Bottom - Never ask No
UC Browser 12 Android - mobile Bottom - Never ask No
Edge 42 Windows - desktop Bottom Icon Ask again No
Konqueror 5 Linux - desktop Center - Ask again No
Web 3 Linux - desktop Top - Never ask No
2.1 The web permission API
The web permission API offers a uniform way for websites to ask
users’ permission for critical features that require user consent,
such as camera, clipboard, microphone, or geolocation. When a
website requires a specific permission, a dialog box appears in the
browser and the user can grant, deny, or dismiss the permission.
Users can also revoke or grant the permission later in the browsers’
settings. Nevertheless, for inexperienced users, it is challenging to
find out where the permissions, which have been asked previously,
are in browsers’ settings.
The permission API behaves differently in different browsers.
For example, a website cannot ask twice for a denied permission
on the desktop version of Google Chrome, while it can do so after
reloading on the desktop version of Mozilla Firefox.
2.2 Clickjacking attacks
There exist three main types of clickjacking attacks. In the first
attack, Jeopardizing target display integrity, adversaries attempt to
either set a sensitive UI element to be transparent and place an
attractive decoy element beneath the main element, or they cover
part of a sensitive UI element by overlaying a decoy element [12].1
In the second attack, Jeopardizing pointer integrity, adversaries
show a fake cursor (pointer) instead of the real cursor to victims,
and conceal the default cursor programmatically [3] [10].
In contrast to the two previous attack types, in the Jeopardizing
temporal integrity attack, adversaries set a sensitive element to
appear on top of a decoy element when users are busy clicking on
the decoy element. The users observe the sensitive element, but
are trapped into making an unwanted click due to having a very
limited time to stop an action—humans need at least a few hundred
milliseconds to react to a sudden visual change. Adversaries use this
type of attacks in online games, i.e., Adobe Flash webcam access,
and security dialog bypass by captcha.2 3
1https://feross.org/webcam-spy
2https://www.squarefree.com/2004/07/01/race-conditions-in-security-dialogs/
3https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=162020
2.3 The problem
The usual way to keep users safe from temporal integrity attacks
is to provide them with enough time to grasp any UI changes. For
instance, to install a Chrome extension, users need to wait until the
delay expires.
We found that almost none of the popular browsers take such
a preventive measure when presenting the web permission API
dialog box. The dialog box often appears in the area where web-
sites present some content, e.g., images or clickable elements, and
therefore users might click on the allow button inadvertently.
We tested 14 browsers to collect data about where the permission
dialog box appears, how each browser informs users that the web-
cam or microphone is in use, and how each browser behaves when
the web permission dialog box is dismissed. The position of the
dialog box depends on several factors. The first factor is that the but-
tons of the dialog box have different sizes in different browsers. For
instance, in Safari, the buttons are narrower compared to those of
Chrome, where the buttons are rectangular. Another factor, which
is user-dependent, is that different types of bars below the address
bar in browsers affect the position of the permission dialog box.
For instance, the bookmark bar on the Chrome browser makes
the dialog box appear at different coordinates. Table 1 shows the
results of our observations. For instance, in the desktop version of
Safari, version 13, the web permission dialog box appears in the
top center of screen and informs users that the webcam is in use
by placing a camera icon on the website’s tab. In case a user clicks
on the deny button of specific permission, an attacker can trigger
the same permission under the same domain name more than once.
In desktop browsers, the dialog box becomes visible usually on the
top part of the browsers under the address bar. In all tested desk-
top browsers, there is a small blinking icon next to the website’s
icon, intended to catch the attention of users. In contrast, mobile
browsers show a notification in the notification bar which clearly
notifies users that the website is using your camera or microphone.
Firefox, Konqueror, and Safari behave in such a way that websites
can request specific permission more than once when users dismiss
the permission for the first time. In contrast, the other browsers
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do not allow websites to ask for the same permission after being
dismissed by users. Therefore, adversaries need to be careful in
drafting their attack scenarios to precisely land a user’s click on the
allow button of the dialog box for such browsers. Only the desktop
version of Firefox and Chrome accept user clicks with a short delay
when a user clicks rapidly before the permission dialog box appears.
The other tested browsers do not offer any preventive measures at
the time of writing.
3 FURIOUS CLICKER
We now describe how we designed a game, called Furious Clicker,4
to land a user click on the allow button of the web permission dialog
box.
The game is designed in such a way as to persuade users to click
quickly on an HTML element in order to complete an engaging task.
The goal of Furious Clicker is to lift a basketball up and eventually
drop it into a net, as shown in Figure 1. In the game, however,
gravity is strong. To lift the basketball up, users need to defeat
gravity by clicking very fast on a blue button, otherwise the ball
will not go up far enough to fall into the net. The faster a user clicks
on the button, the more the basketball goes up. We measure the
time between two clicks of a user. If the time is very short (e.g., less
than 100 milliseconds), it conveys that the user is clicking fast and
we raise the basketball more quickly.
In the beginning, the game asks the user to input a nickname,
which is combinedwith a randomnumber. In case the user clicks at a
slow pace, the game encourages the user to click faster by displaying
a message. The game issues two more messages depending on
user’s clicking speed, to persuade them to reach the highest speed.
Eventually, when the ball reaches the net, the game displays a
congratulatory message for completing the game successfully. On
the desktop version of browsers, we place a basketball hoop on the
right side of the screen to divert the user’s attention to that side. This
cannot be done in mobile browsers as the screen size is too small.
Therefore, touch-based devices require a specific design, such as
bigger icons and buttons, as users cannot click accurately on small
HTML elements. The malicious blue button in the game, which
is called the decoy element, must be placed in a precise position
depending on the victim’s user agent and platform, as discussed in
subsection 2.3, otherwise, the attack will fail (see Figure 2).
In order to decide when to trigger the web permission dialog
box, we established a clicking threshold to estimate the level of user
engagement in the game. We iterated our initial test 20 times with
different thresholds for the number of clicks. We determined that
between 8 and 12 consecutive fast clicks indicate a high likelihood
that the user will mistakenly click on the allow button. The duration
between each click needs to be less than 70 milliseconds, and the
number of clicks should be more than 8 consecutive clicks.
Once a user reaches the fast clicking threshold, the game triggers
the web permission. In case the user clicks on the allow button, the
game takes a photo and silently sends it to the server. If the user
stops clicking and chooses the deny button, the game will send a
message to the server stating that the player is not tricked.
We examined different color schemes for the background color
of Furious Clicker. To avoid distracting users, finally, we chose
4https://www.crypto-explorer.com/clickjacking
Figure 1: The desktop version of Furious Clicker
Figure 2: The web permission dialog box’s position in the
game
the white background color as it is close to the color of the web
permission dialog box.
4 USER EXPERIMENT
We investigate how effective the Furious Clicker is in tricking users
to click on the allow button when a browser presents a permission
dialog box.
4.1 Method
We asked for interested students in twelve classes of a private
educational technology and engineering institute to participate in
our research study. We conducted three experiments with a total
of 120 participants who willingly took part in our experiments
without being paid. The participants were all studying practical
courses related to engineering or computer science. They all had
an academic background (i.e., 67% Bachelor degree, and 33% Master
degree). Only 22 had their degree in Computer Science. None of the
participants had knowledge of or expertise in information security.
We designed three different experiments to assess how success-
ful the Furious Clicker is in tricking users to grant the camera
permission. Table 2 gives an overview of the three experiments. In
particular, we designed one experiment to examine the impact of
the existing preventive measure when clicking fast in the desktop
version of Chrome; the second experiment tests the Safari browser
which offers no preventive measure; and finally, we conduct an
experiment with the mobile version of the Chrome browser, which
also offers no preventive measures. In the first two experiments,
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Table 2: The three experiments for evaluating Furious Clicker
Browser Version Platform Device Prevention # of Participants
Chrome 72 MacOS Mouse Yes - delay 40
Safari 13 MacOS Mouse No 40
Chrome 78 Android Finger touch No 40
participants are required to use a mouse, whereas in the last exper-
iment users use the touch feature of the smartphone.
We divided the participants into three equal groups, each consist-
ing of 40 people, and assigned each group to a different experiment.
We first conducted an offline survey to understand the level of fa-
miliarity of participants with browsers and web permissions. We
then presented the game to participants of each group and made
sure that everyone understands how the game works. We stated
that the goal of the test is to measure how fast people are able to
click and evaluates the impact of such games on gamers in which
fast clicking is required. We also observed how each participant
engages in the game.
We interviewed each participant right after playing the game.
We asked their opinion about the game and also what they observed
while playing the game.
4.2 Results
We present the results of the three experiments in Figure 3. In the
first experiment, 19 participants clicked on the allow button and
did not realize what they clicked. Suspicions of all the remaining
21 participants arose as they observed the web permission dialog
asking for camera access. This is due to the short delay implemented
in Google Chrome. Of the users who were not tricked, 14 stopped
playing the game as soon as they saw the permission dialog box
pop up, and seven closed the dialog box, and continued playing
after a short interruption.
In the second experiment, 29 participants clicked on the allow
button and finished the game successfully. Seven contestants were
not tricked because of their incorrect mouse coordinates during
the fast click process. Their mouse pointer exited the region of the
decoy button when the dialog box appeared. The rest of the not
tricked participants stopped unexpectedly exactly when the game
decided to show the web permission dialog box.
In the last experiment, we used the mobile version of Google
Chrome on Android devices. In total, 38 participants were tricked
into clicking on the allow button and only two of them suddenly
stopped while clicking on the button.
We were interested to know how familiar participants are with
web permissions. We therefore surveyed participants before con-
ducting the experiments. To minimize the Hawthorne effect, we
also populated the survey with some questions regarding other fea-
tures of browsers, not relevant to web permissions, such as browser
history, bookmarks, anonymous mode, and 3D games [6]. Almost
83% of all 120 participants had never played a game on browsers
while others had played at least once. Participants were mainly
familiar with the history feature of browsers (95%). More than three
quarters (83%) of the participants had their customized bookmarks
in their favorite browser. As the privacy of data has been emerging
as a concern for web users, the anonymity feature of browsers had
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Figure 3: The number of participants with different status
in each experiment
been used by 57% of the participants. We also asked if they had
any experience in granting permission in the web environment.
Participants did not know much about permissions and how they
work in browsers as only 42% had some experience with web per-
missions. Finally, the least familiarity was for 3D games as only
10% of participants played such games in web settings.
At the end of each experiment, we asked the participants to
express their judgment about the game. The 34 participants who
were not tricked in all three experiments accurately realized why
the button was located there and why they needed to click fast.
In the first experiment, nine participants from the tricked users
group realized that they clicked on the allow button but they were
not familiar with the web permission dialog box. As a result, they
could not figure out what the consequences might be of clicking on
the allow button. After the second experiment, eight participants
who were tricked into clicking on the allow button noticed a box
appeared but could not guess what it could be. From the ones who
were tricked in the smartphone’s browser, only two participants
had a weak doubt whether it was a web permission dialog box
or not. Participants in the mobile browser experiment found that
it was extremely difficult to avoid clicking on the allow button
while clicking rapidly. Although the prevention technique in Google
Chrome reduced the chance of fooling users by 52%, the preventive
approach cannot prevent such attacks effectively.
4.3 Discussion
Interestingly, among all the participants, only eight people knew
how the granted permission could be revoked from the desktop
and mobile browser. This conveys that it is complicated for in-
experienced users to revoke given permissions in browsers. The
findings of this study suggest that browsers should list a website’s
granted/blocked permissions in an easy to access manner. In prac-
tice, browsers need to implement some preventive measures to
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decrease the likelihood of clickjacking attacks. As we observed,
Google chrome has considerably decreased the impact of this at-
tack by applying a very short delay on its desktop version. Browser
vendors can employ the delay technique for the allow button. How-
ever, it might not be a sufficient defense mechanism against such
attacks as we proved that almost half of our participants were
tricked into clicking the allow button. To boost the prevention ap-
proach, we suggest invalidating the focus of the mouse pointer for
a short period to allow users to perceive the instant UI changes.
However, finding a tradeoff between a preventive measure and user
experience is a challenging problem, which requires a dedicated
study. For instance, a long UI delay could have a negative effect on
user experience.
We reported the issue to Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome
and the two companies approved the validity of the problem. For-
tunately Google Chrome in its newest version has patched this
problem as follows: if the dialog box appears when the user is busy
clicking, it does not accept any clicks until the user pauses for a
second and clicks again. Although the desktop version of Google
Chrome is armed with the new mitigation strategy, the mobile ver-
sion of this browser has no prevention mechanism yet. We have
contacted the remaining browser vendors and are awaiting their
response.
5 RELATEDWORK
Rydstedt et al. analyzed the top 500 websites to study if they im-
plemented any preventive measures regarding clickjacking attacks
[8]. They found that all the defense mechanisms used by the web-
sites can be circumvented. To prevent clickjacking, they proposed a
JavaScript-based mitigation method as a temporary measure until
browsers fully support the X-FRAME-OPTIONS header. Five new
clickjacking attacks were introduced by Akhawe et al. to circum-
vent current UI safety specifications proposed by W3C [1]. They
obtained a success rate between 20% to 99% in challenging the
limitations of current defenses against UI attacks. The proposed
attacks exploit various aspects of human perception, for instance,
adaptation, attention, and peripheral vision.
The ProClick framework, developed by Shahriar et al., is designed
to work as a proxy-level clickjacking detection framework [9]. Their
framework works by examining the contents of requests and re-
sponses at the proxy level to detect clickjacking attacks. Shamsi
et al. developed a clickjacking prevention tool, called Clicksafe
[11]. The developed Firefox add-on intercepts users while clicking
on clickable elements with redirection code and warns users by
a popup displaying necessary information. In a study, Huang et
al. proposed the InContext defense mechanism to enforce context
integrity of user actions on sensitive UI elements [5]. Similarly, they
developed a game in which they use a fake cursor and ask users
to click rapidly on a button shown randomly in different locations
in a browser. Once the users are engaged in the game, the game
switches to a Facebook Like button at the real cursor’s location,
tricking the user into clicking on it. They carried out an experi-
ment with 2 064 participants and achieved a success rate ranging
from 43% to 98% in different scenarios. They concluded that InCon-
text could assist participants against visual and temporal integrity
clickjacking attacks.
The proposed detection tools and circumvention of defensemech-
anisms consider HTML elements, JavaScript code snippets, or spec-
ifications proposed by W3C. However, in this study, we target a
browser feature, which is neither dependent on HTML elements
nor JavaScript defense mechanisms.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented Furious Clicker, a web-based game to trick users
into granting web permissions. We tested two desktop browsers
and one mobile browser in order to see how users react when the
permission dialog box appears. A preliminary study showed that
Furious Clicker is successful in tricking 72% of the 120 participants.
Due to the rise of mobile phone usage nowadays, we believe that
this issue has a grave impact on the security of mobile internet
users. Browsers can prevent this issue by using the delay method
for buttons or by invalidating the focus of the mouse pointer to
interrupt clicking. However, finding a satisfactory tradeoff between
a preventive measure and user experience is a challenging problem,
which requires further study.
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